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This paper has three parts. In the first, we present some basic notions, such as mental 
and intentional causation, and causation itself; we then proceed to state some theses, 
inspired by the natural sciences and to show how they seem to conflict with the 
acceptance of intentional causation. This conflict is the core of the problem of mental 
causation. In the second part, we present and discuss briefly some proposals to deal with 
this problem and try to bring to light their difficulties. And, in the third part, we put 
forward some tentative suggestions as to how the problem of intentional causation 
might eventually find a solution. 
 
1. Mental and intentional causation: the problem 
Mental causation is the process by which certain events or states, by virtue of 
being mental, i.e. of having mental properties, give rise to changes in the physical 
properties of the world, by giving rise to physical events or states such as brain changes, 
muscles’ contractions and overt bodily actions. The caveat “by virtue of having mental 
properties” is intended to exclude cases in which some events that actually have mental 
properties cause physical events, but where those mental properties are completely 
irrelevant to the causal relation. These would be cases of physical, not mental causation. 
Dretske makes this point very clearly. He writes: 
 
Something possessing content, or having content, can be a cause without its 
possessing that content or having that meaning being at all relevant to its causal 
powers. A soprano’s upper-register supplications may shatter glass, but their 
meaning is irrelevant to their having this effect. Their effect on the glass would be 
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the same if they meant nothing at all or something entirely different (Dretske 
1988, p. 79). 
 
Intuitively, the glass’ shattering as a result of the singing is a case of purely physical, 
not mental, causation, even if the singing has mental properties. 
 A second point of clarification concerns the notion of a mental property. With 
Dretske and many other thinkers, we assume that semantic properties such as content or 
meaning are among mental properties. Having content or meaning is a sufficient 
condition for some state or event to be mental. In this sense, a meaningful speech act 
counts as mental, as do beliefs, purposes, hopes or desires. However, having content or 
meaning is not necessary for mentality, for pure sensations (‘raw feels’, ‘qualia’) are 
intuitively mental events or states even if they lack any content or meaning. Interesting 
as these “qualitative” properties of some mental states may be, in this paper we shall 
restrict our attention to semantic properties and states or events having them. Given this 
restriction, we may afford to remain neutral for what respects other possible properties 
of those states characteristically emphasized by Cartesianism, such as privacy, 
subjectivity or first-person infallibility or incorrigibility. So, those who conceive of 
meaning and content as social and publicly accessible properties do still face the 
problem of mental causation, provided that they take states and events with those 
properties to be mental. 
 Let us now say some words about causation. This is in itself a hard and 
controversial philosophical issue. However, a minimal assumption about causation 
seems to be part and parcel of any reasonable view of it, namely that causes make a 
difference to their effects in that at least they make the occurrence of the latter more 
probable than it would have been without them. Raising the probability of some event’s 
occurrence seems to be a necessary condition for something to be a cause of that event. 
It is hard to see how event A could possibly be a cause of event B if B’s occurrence 
would have been equally probable in the absence of A. Applied to the causal relevance 
of properties, this assumption becomes something like this: in order for property P of 
event A to be causally relevant for A’s causing event B, then, all else being equal, A’s 
having P should make B’s occurrence more probable than it would be otherwise. This 
assumption is very weak and very plausible as well; and it is compatible with different 
views of causality, deterministic or probabilistic, nomological, counterfactual, and 
others. Deterministic views, for example, may interpret the assumption so that, all else 
 3 
being equal, the presence of the cause raises the probability of the effect to 1. In the 
above quotation, Dretske employs a version of this assumption in order to show the 
causal irrelevance of the meaning of the soprano’s singing for the glass’ shattering; the 
singing’s meaning does not make the probability of the shattering higher than it would 
be without it, for the shattering would have taken place exactly as it did even if the 
singing had borne no meaning at all; therefore, meaning was causally irrelevant to the 
causal relation at hand. Now, we think that accepting this minimal assumption about 
causality is enough for the problem of mental causation to arise. We will try to justify 
this contention below. 
Mental causation is a special case of the more general phenomenon of 
mind/body causal interaction, namely mind-to-body causation. As we anticipated, in 
this paper we will focus mainly on a particular species of mental causation, which may 
be called intentional causation. In intentional causation, the mental properties of the 
causing events or states are semantic properties, especially meanings and contents. We 
are all too familiar with intentional causation. Our presence in this workshop is a result 
of a process of intentional causation in the indicated sense, provided that we have come 
to Rome by virtue of having certain intentional states, purposes, beliefs, preferences and 
the like. 
Some philosophers have thought, and some still think,1 that, even if intentional 
states or events sometimes explain an agent’s action by giving her reasons for 
performing it, this sort of explanation is not causal and those intentional states (reasons) 
are not causes of the action. Now, it may seem that, in assuming that there is a problem 
of intentional causation, we are begging the question against these non-causalist 
thinkers, for they would deny that there is such a thing as intentional causation and so 
any problem about it at all. However, if we are right that accepting the above 
assumption about causation is enough for the problem of mental causation to arise, then 
mental causation, with a different name, is also a problem for non-causalists. In effect, if 
the above assumption about causation is correct, then, by accepting the truth of 
statements of the form “S A-ed for reason R”, they are implicitly accepting that S’s 
having R made S’s A-ing more likely than it would have been otherwise. If they did not 
accept this, then it is hard to see how the explanation could be true. So, non-causalists 
seem also committed, concerning reasons, to the indicated assumption about causes and 
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causally relevant properties; and, it being so, they must admit that reasons, understood 
as mental states or events, make a difference to the physical world and it is legitimate to 
ask them for an explanation of that fact.2 Under a different label, then, mental causation 
is also a problem for non-causalists about reasons and reasons-explanations. 
In spite of its central importance in human life and of our apparent familiarity 
with it, intentional causation seems to conflict with some general views inspired in 
natural sciences, such as: 1) the causal closure of the physical domain; 2) a layered and 
hierarchical view of the world, in which the physical level is metaphysically basic; and 
3) the view that the brain, which controls our intentional behaviour, is a purely 
syntactic, not a semantic device, so that it cannot be sensitive to contents or meanings. 
According to 1), in Baker’s words, “every physical property-instantiation that 
has a cause at t has a complete physical cause at t” (Baker 1993, p. 78). Roughly, every 
physical event has a complete physical cause. The physical domain, then, is causally 
closed: there is no need to get out of it in order to find complete, fully sufficient causes, 
and corresponding causal explanations, of what happens within it. Causal closure does 
not apply to orders of phenomena other than the physical one. Some biological 
phenomena may have chemical or microphysical causes. And the same holds for 
psychological phenomena: certain psychological changes may be caused by chemical 
changes in the blood or the brain. This is the point of calling certain chemical 
substances “psychoactive”. And there is no need to go that far: the process of forming 
beliefs based on perception of our surroundings shows the causal openness of the 
psychological realm. Now, at least apparently, intentional causation seems to conflict 
with the causal closure of the physical domain. If sometimes we act intentionally 
because of what we believe, desire, or intend, then, since our so acting involves several 
physical changes, these changes also occur, at least partly, because of the contents of 
those states. And this looks like a breach of the causal closure of the physical. In fact, it 
is not even required that we actually perform those actions; it is enough, for that breach, 
that the probability of our so acting, and of the corresponding physical changes, is 
raised by the contents of our beliefs or intentions. That some changes in the probability 
degrees of certain physical changes are due to mental events as mental looks like an 
intrusion of non-physical factors into the physical domain and so as a violation of its 
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causal closure. But why should this violation be a problem? Jaegwon Kim answers as 
follows: “[T]o give up this [physical closure] principle is to acknowledge that there can 
in principle be no complete physical theory of physical phenomena, that theoretical 
physics, insofar as it aspires to be a complete theory, must cease to be pure physics and 
invoke irreducibly non-physical causal powers” (Kim 1993, p. 209). 
Let us move on to 2). This is a metaphysical worldview inspired in natural 
science. According to it, the world has a layered and hierarchical structure of 
ontological levels or strata, some of which are more basic than others, so that more 
basic levels can exist without the less basic ones, but not vice versa. Roughly, the level 
of physical entities and properties would be the more basic, followed by the chemical, 
biological and psychological levels in this order. To this ontological hierarchy 
corresponds an epistemological and explanatory hierarchy of sciences: physics, 
chemistry, biology and the different sciences of life (including neuroscience), and, 
finally, psychology and the human and social sciences. This hierarchy rests on an order 
that is both chronological and causal: the physicochemical stratum existed long before, 
and gave rise to, the biological one, which, in turn, came into existence before, and gave 
rise to, the mental stratum. According to this hierarchical view of the world, there are 
causal relations between different levels, but causation always proceeds in an upward 
direction. Events and processes of lower strata affect causally those of higher strata, but 
are not affected by them. We may characterize the relations among the levels in terms of 
supervenience, understood as a relation of metaphysical dependence. Entities, 
properties, and causal processes of a given level supervene on those of lower levels, 
which are in turn their supervenience bases. In this context, the physical level is the 
most basic of all: their properties and causal processes do not supervene on those of any 
other level, and these in turn supervene ultimately on the physical level. Now, 
intentional causation seems to violate these hierarchical and supervenience relations, for 
it implies that certain mental events, by virtue of their mental properties, bring about 
changes at lower levels, including the most basic microphysical entities and processes. 
In this respect, intentional causation seems to involve an objectionable and mysterious 
form of downward causation. 
Concerning 3), a position that might be called “syntacticalism”,3 the claim is that 
brain processes and structures can only be sensitive to physical or, at most, syntactical 
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properties of signs or events, not to their semantic properties, such as content or 
meaning. Syntacticalism is closely related to computational functionalism, for which 
computers are models of the relations between mind and body. On this perspective, 
mental processes should be conceived as operations on signs, or inputs generally, 
according to their form, not to their meaning. But the deep questions raised by 
syntacticalism do not depend on accepting computational functionalism. In Daniel 
Dennett’s words, the view would be as follows; 
 
[T]he brain is first and foremost a syntactic engine, which can be fruitfully viewed 
as reliably mimicking a semantic engine, but in which meanings themselves never 
overrule, overpower, or so much as influence the brute mechanistic or syntactic 
flow of local causation in the nervous system. (A semantic engine, I claim, is a 
mechanistic impossibility – like a perpetual motion machine...) (Dennett 1991, p. 
119). 
 
Now, if the brain is the system that controls and brings about voluntary behaviour, then 
only physical and syntactical properties will be causally relevant to such behaviour.4 
Concerning it, then, semantic properties appear to be causally idle, purely 
epiphenomenal properties. So far, intentional causation, which implies the causal 
relevance of content and meaning, would seem to be incompatible with syntacticalism. 
The philosophical problem of intentional causation, and mental causation 
generally, is partly the problem of what to do with these conflicts. Our firm conviction 
about intentional causation is that it is sometimes what we believe, desire, or intend, i.e., 
the content of these states or events (as well as the fact that we believe, desire, or intend 
that content to be true), a decisive factor in leading us to act in certain ways. In other 
words, we are convinced that content is causally relevant to our intentional behaviour. 
On the other hand, the general views inspired in natural sciences seem also to be 
important and well motivated. A good solution to the problem of intentional causation, 
then, would be to show how to reconcile that firm everyday conviction, which is part 
and parcel of our self-image as rational agents, with the scientifically inspired views. 
However, showing this consistency has proved to be quite a hard enterprise. 
 
                                                 
4 As Kim expresses this idea: “Syntacticalism appears to entail that intentional properties of mental states, 
those properties in which their mentality consists, are causally irrelevant” (Kim 1991, p. 55). 
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2. Some proposals about intentional causation 
In fact, as far as we know, existing proposals to deal with this problem are less 
than satisfactory. We shall present, and comment on, some of them. 
One possibility, associated with some non-causalists and some of Wittgenstein’s 
followers,5 is to hold that reasons, understood as mental states with content, explain 
intentional actions, not bodily movements, whereas brain states and events explain 
bodily movements, not intentional actions. This “dual explanandum strategy”, as it 
might be called, is intended to show that there is no real conflict or tension between 
causal explanations in natural sciences and everyday reasons explanations, for their 
respective explananda are not the same. As I see things, however, the strategy has 
problems. Even if it is true that mental states with content (reasons) explain behaviour 
viewed or described as intentional, such mental states are also causally responsible, on 
each occasion in which an agent acts intentionally, for the occurrence of bodily 
movements involved in that intentional action, for presumably these movements would 
not have occurred if the agent had not performed the intentional action at issue; and, at 
least in some cases, she would not have performed it unless she had had those mental 
states with the contents they had. The fact that we do not have a unified theory that 
connects concepts or descriptions of mental states with concepts or descriptions of 
bodily movements, understood as physical and physiological events, does not imply that 
the former are not causally responsible for the latter. And so the problem of how this 
intentional, mental-to-physical, downward causation can take place does not vanish. 
Another possibility is reductionism, in its many varieties. Think of so-called 
property- or type-identity theory. According to it, mental properties just are (in the sense 
of “are identical with”) neurophysiologic properties, and so ultimately physical 
properties. So, mental properties are causally relevant because physical properties are 
causally relevant and mental properties are physical properties. Intentional causation 
involves no mystery. Mental causation does not breach the principle of the causal 
closure of the physical domain, for it is physical causation itself. Nor does it involve 
downward causation. In the context of the hierarchical worldview, the idea would be 
that the psychological entities and properties do not constitute a level on its own, but are 
part of the biological level; there is, then, no downward causal influence from the 
                                                 
5 But not only them. Peacocke also seems to endorse such a strategy: “It is true that brain states and 
efferent connections will be enough to explain any given bodily movement. But what is distinctively 
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go beyond mere bodily movements” (Peacocke 1993, p. 207) 
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mental/psychological to the biological level; and, at the end, biological properties are, or 
supervene on, physicochemical properties; instantiations of biological properties do not 
have autonomous causal powers, but inherit them from those instantiations of 
physicochemical properties which they supervene on (or are identical with). So, 
causation is always upwards, and downward causation is a mere appearance. It may be 
objected that type-identity theory does not respect the conviction that content is causally 
relevant in getting us to act. But the theory can account for this conviction as well, since 
contents themselves are, on this view, neurophysiologic properties, and so as causally 
relevant as these can be. 
The main problem with type-identity theory is that the prospects for its truth are 
rather bleak. Initially, the first proponents of this theory restricted it to sensations and 
other “qualitative” states, and for good reasons, since the theory is more plausible 
concerning these states, especially in the case of quite primitive sensations, such as 
pain, than about intentional states. A necessary condition for intentional properties to be 
identical with neurophysiologic properties is that there be strict nomological 
correlations between them, so that, e.g., the brains of all human subjects who believe 
that the Earth moves around the Sun share one and the same neurophysiologic property. 
But there are good empirical reasons for thinking that there are no such strict 
correlations. It is very plausible to think that, if intentional properties, like the indicated 
belief, have neurophysiologic realizations (or supervenience bases) at all, these 
realizations or bases can be very different in different subjects, depending on a variety 
of factors such as their genetic endowment, mother language, personal development, 
and others. They can even be different in the same individual at different times. 
Multiple realizability of mental properties is, then, a serious objection against type-
identity theory. 
Still more damaging for this theory is semantic and content externalism, 
according to which meanings and intentional contents do not even supervene on neural 
properties, so that two physically identical individuals can differ in the meaning of their 
utterances and in the content of their beliefs and other intentional states owing to 
differences in their respective environments, natural or social, even if these differences 
have no internal reflection in their brains and bodies. Hilary Putnam (1975), Tyler 
Burge (1979) and other philosophers have forcefully argued for semantic and content 
externalism. 
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But if content externalism stands in the way of neurophysiologic reductionism, it 
is also an obstacle to intentional causation itself, for it would seem that properties that 
are causally relevant to behaviour generation should be internal to an agent’s body, 
whereas, if externalism is true, meaning and content are extrinsic and relational 
properties, not fixed solely by factors internal to the brain or body. This favours 
syntacticalism, the view that only signs, not their meanings or contents, can be causally 
relevant to behaviour production. 
Other reductive proposals, such as Kim’s, also face difficulties. Type identity 
theory rested on a Nagelian model of reduction, on which reduction involves derivation 
of the laws of the reduced theory from the reducing one, with the help of biconditionals 
(“bridge laws”) that connect the predicates of both theories, thus giving rise to one-to-
one equivalence relation between properties. Kim sees this model of reduction as 
seriously defective (cf. Kim 2000, pp. 90 ff.) He advocates a different model, which 
involves two main steps. First, a functional analysis of the property to be reduced, in 
which that property (or the concept thereof) is conceived just in terms of its typical 
causal relations to other properties, states and phenomena, not in terms of its physical 
constitution. This makes this functionally analysed property into a second-order 
property, which quantifies existentially over first-order properties. The second step is 
the statement of a relation of realization between the second-order property and the 
first-order properties that meet the causal specifications given in the functional analysis. 
The first-order properties realize the abstract, second-order functional property. This 
model allows for reconciliation between reduction and multiple realization. Fragility, 
for instance, would be a second-order property, realized by several different molecular 
structures. Mental properties should also be conceived as second-order, functional 
properties, which are realized by several distinct physical, presumably neural, 
properties. According to Kim, realization implies supervenience: if physical property P 
realizes mental property M, then M supervenes on P. Concerning the causal powers of 
mental events and properties, he holds that they are identical with the causal powers of 
the neural events and properties which realize them and on which they supervene: 
 
On a reductionist position of this sort ... the causal powers of mental properties 
turn out to be just those of their physical realizers, and there are no new causal 
powers brought into the world by mental properties (Kim 2000, p. 118) 
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So, on Kim’s proposal, mental events or states cause other events or states by virtue of 
the physical properties and causal powers of their neural realizers or supervenience 
bases, not by virtue of their own mental properties. Since (unlike what happens in 
identity theory and at least in cases of multiple realizers) mental properties are not 
identical with the neural properties that realize them, mental properties appear to be 
causally idle. In this respect, Kim’s functional reductionist model does not fare 
essentially better, for what concerns the threat of epiphenomenalism about mental 
properties, than his earlier model of mental causation as supervenient causation. So, in 
the context of the latter, he writes:  
 
[A]lthough content properties are relational ... the causal power of a given 
instance of a content property [e.g. a particular belief, C. M.] lies wholly in the 
causal power of the neural state on which it supervenes (Kim 1991, p. 67) 
 
So far, rather than accounting for mental causation, Kim’s reductionism seems actually 
to rule it out. 
Beyond this central problem, Kim’s proposal faces other difficulties as well. 
First, content externalism, if true, excludes not only identity of mental and neural 
properties, but also supervenience of the former on the latter. And, given that realization 
implies supervenience, excluding supervenience implies excluding realization as well. 
As far as we see, without neural realization and supervenience of the mental, however, 
Kim’s proposal collapses. Second, relations between mental states, and between them 
and intentional behaviour, show certain semantic and inferential patterns without which 
human beings could not be held to be rational beings. However, since mental states and 
intentional behaviour are supervenient on neural bases, which relate to each other in a 
purely causal and factual way, according to certain natural laws, those rational patterns 
appear as a sort of brute fact or surprising coincidence, and are left unexplained within 
Kim’s model. 
Dennett (1991) intends to show that, though the real causal work is done by 
physical properties of the brain, not by meanings or contents, there is a reliable harmony 
between physical properties and semantic properties, a harmony established by 
evolution and conditioning processes. Dennett’s proposal could be of help with our last 
objection to Kim’s position. Nevertheless, on Dennett’s perspective, no less than on 
Kim’s, intentional causation becomes a mere appearance. Our strong conviction that 
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sometimes we act in certain ways because of what we believe or want, or because of the 
meaning of others’ (and our own) utterances, would be a mere illusion, brought about 
by ‘harmonizing’ processes. On Dennett’s proposal, we mimic semantic systems; we act 
as if we were sensitive to meanings, but we are not and cannot be so. As in Kim’s case, 
this is not to explain intentional causation, but actually to deny it. 
As for non-reductive materialist proposals, it is widely acknowledged that one of 
them, namely anomalous monism, does not accord mental properties enough causal 
relevance. Concerning emergentism, it would seem to have problems with some of the 
views inspired by science, such as the causal closure of the physical domain and the 
layered, hierarchical worldview. But new and increasingly refined versions of 
emergentism are being designed and we should not discard that some of them might be 
able to overcome such problems.6 
Dretske’s interesting attempt to naturalize meaning and content (cf. Dretske 
1988, 2009) goes a certain distance towards reconciling intentional causation with 
scientifically inspired views. According to Dretske, mental causes are what he calls 
“structuring causes” of behaviour. Behaviour itself “is not the bodily movements that 
internal events cause, but the causing of these movements by internal events” (Dretske 
2009, p. 21). Bodily movements are caused and explained by the physical properties of 
internal events, but in order to understand why certain internal events cause those 
movements we have to advert to semantic properties of the internal events; certain 
internal events are recruited as causes of certain bodily movements because of what 
they indicate about the environment, and not only because of their intrinsic physical 
properties. There is still some distance between the notion of indication and that of 
meaning or content, a distance that has to do with the intensionality and the possibility 
of error (e.g., false beliefs) which characterize intentional states; this is an endemic 
problem for informational and naturalizing theories of content and meaning, such as 
Dretske’s, Fodor’s, or Millikan’s; but the proposal is suggestive and it might be further 
refined so as to solve this problem; in fact, some aspects of those proposals, such as 
Millikan’s notion of proper function, are quite plausible in this respect. Another 
problem of Dretske’s position is that intentional states seem to figure, in ordinary 
reasons explanation, not (or not just) as structuring causes but, in Dretske’s terms, as 
                                                 
6 Interesting insights can be found in Murphy (2010). 
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triggering causes as well.7 We usually do not want to know why a certain desire led 
someone to act in a certain way, but why she acted that way, and we try to find some 
beliefs or desires of her in order to answer this question; and these beliefs and desires 
would seem to function as ordinary, triggering causal factors.8 
Robert Van Gulick (1993) has also put forward a valuable proposal for 
understanding downward causation that has some points of similarity with Dretske’s. 
According to Van Gulick, the predicates of special sciences individuate patterns of 
organization of physical constituents, and these patterns have causal powers of their 
own, which cannot be understood simply in terms of those of their ultimate physical 
constituents and the laws of physics (cf. Van Gulick, p. 250). He writes: 
 
[H]igher-order patterns can have a degree of independence from their underlying 
physical realizations and can exert what might be called downward causal 
influences without requiring  any objectionable form of emergentism by which 
higher-order properties would alter the underlying laws of physics. Higher-order 
properties act by the selective activation of physical powers not by their alteration 
(Van Gulick 1993, p. 252) 
 
Van Gulick’s proposal applies especially well to cases in which, say, biological 
patterns activate underlying physical powers, but we still need to understand how this 
process functions in the case of intentional patterns. But the approach is undoubtedly 
promising.9 
 
3. Some suggestions about intentional causation 
It would be unbearably pretentious to think that we can provide a solution to the 
problem of intentional causation. But here are at least some tentative suggestions as to 
how we could begin to understand the causal relevance of content and meaning to brain 
                                                 
7 As Horgan writes: “[W]e think of the reason, qua reason, as relevant not merely (and not mainly) 
insofar as its content might figure in some past-operative structuring cause of the present action, but 
rather as a full-fledged triggering cause of the action, and indeed as a current triggering cause. But 
Dretske is committed to denying that reasons, described as reasons, have this kind of here-and-now 
explanatory relevance” (Horgan 1991, pp. 88-89). 
8 In relation to this, Dretske’s view of behaviour as the process by which certain internal events cause 
bodily movements looks quite strained and alien to our ordinary concept. 
9 Murphy’s paper refers quite extensively to Van Gulick’s ideas as congenial to her own emergentist 
view. For a more detailed exposition of Dretske’s and Van Gulick’s proposals cf. my 2004, chapter 14. 
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processes and overt behaviour, and so downward causation, without breaking a 
reasonable allegiance to science.10 
A step towards that end is a reflection on the process through which human 
beings are introduced into social semantic systems, such as musical notation and its 
interpretation with one’s voice or a musical instrument, or just, to take a more common 
example, ordinary language. Each sound or utterance made by the learner requires 
internal neurophysiologic causal antecedents; in this respect, we have upward causation; 
increasingly better performance as a musical interpreter or as a speaker requires, it 
seems, increasingly complex neural connections, which causally sustain such 
performances; this is again upward, physical causation; however, which neural 
connections are selected among the myriad that are possible depends upon the objective 
semantic content of the musical or linguistic signs; connections that give rise to correct 
sounds or utterances are reinforced during the learning process, while those that produce 
the wrong results are not; and the difference is determined by the semantic rules that 
govern the systems; in this sense, certain connections within the brain, as well as with 
nerves and muscles, are selected and shaped through a process of downward causation: 
from the contents and meanings of the musical and linguistic signs, according to the 
semantic rules of musical notation and ordinary language, to neural and 
neurophysiologic connections. To this extent, content and meaning, which, as 
externalism has it, go beyond the individual’s brain and bear an objectivity of their own, 
are causally responsible for the actual shaping of the neural connections and networks 
required for a competent musical or linguistic performance. 
As we see things, an important source of resistance against the reality of 
intentional causation is a certain view of human beings that might be taken to be, 
somewhat paradoxically, a sort of materialistic dualism. Whereas, according to old 
forms of dualism, a human being is essentially a soul or thinking thing that contingently 
inhabits a body, for this new dualism a human being is essentially a brain that 
contingently inhabits (the rest of) the body. In current philosophy of mind, and even 
epistemology, the importance of the brain, which we do not want to deny, has been 
magnified, with a corresponding devaluation of other parts of the human body, such as 
the tongue or the hands, which tend to appear as mere peripheral appendices at the 
service of the brain, and ultimately dispensable; every kind of bodily activity, such as 
                                                 
10 We have come to see these suggestions, in retrospect, as having some debt to Dretske’s and Van 
Gulick’s views. 
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the limbs’ movements, is always conceived as a mere effect of brain processes, and 
never as a source or cause of what happens or exists within the brain. This conception 
makes it unintelligible how properties belonging to higher ontological levels, and 
especially meanings or contents, might exert any influence on the structure and 
processes of the brain. It is also an important source of syntacticalism. However, on the 
basis of our preceding considerations, we can see that the agents’ hands, their tongues, 
eyes and vocal muscles, play a decisive and non-dispensable role in the progressive 
shaping of neural connections: it is only through these overt physical movements and 
acts that the process of education and correction, and the corresponding processes of 
selection and reinforcement of neural networks, can take place; only in this way can the 
learner become a competent interpreter and speaker. An isolated, disembodied brain 
could not, by itself, acquire the internal complex shaping that supports musical or 
linguistic performance; it is by selecting certain overt movements among those emitted 
by the agent that the right neural connections are selected and reinforced; and so, though 
each such movement is preceded and caused by a neurological event, there is also a 
causal feedback that goes from objective contents or meanings, through certain physical 
movements of the limbs, selected according to those objective semantic properties, to 
the inner structure of the brain and its internal connections. A disembodied brain, 
without the help of the limbs and other parts of the body, could not learn meanings and 
contents and, if thinking requires them, could not think either. Subjects of thought, of 
beliefs, desires, purposes, and meanings are human beings, not brains by themselves. 
We may grant Dennett that brains are syntactic systems. But a living human 
being is not only a brain, and she is sensitive to meaning. In fact, in the process of 
learning, say, to interpret musical notation, masters have to be sensitive to the sounds 
that correspond to the musical signs and to the relation between signs and sounds, which 
are the signs’ meanings; otherwise they would not be able to correct the learners’ 
performance. And learners become progressively sensitive to such relations, and so to 
meanings, as their competence increases. And this sensitivity helps explain that human 
subjects can respond to signs by virtue of their meaning, not just their form or syntax. 
Meaning is thereby causally relevant to behaviour production. Once a fairly complex 
network of neural connections has been established on the basis of socialization and 
learning, human beings can understand and respond to the meaning of words and other 
signs emitted either by others or by themselves, even in a sub vocalized, purely ‘inner’ 
way. And meanings become progressively ‘transparent’ to us: our experience in our 
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mother language is that we ‘hear’ meanings directly, with signs receding to the 
background. 
Far from being alien to scientific enlightenment, accepting the reality of mental 
and intentional downward causation seems to be required in order to understand and 
explain certain important phenomena. Think for example, in connection with our 
previous remarks about music, of the amazing synchronization of movements by the 
violinists of a good orchestra. There must be important common patterns in their neural 
networks that account for that synchrony. And these common patterns would not be 
there if processes of downward causation, starting from the objective meanings of 
musical signs, had not affected the brains, nerves, and muscles of each of those subjects 
while they learned to read musical notation and to interpret it with their violins. A 
“brute mechanistic or syntactic flow of local causation in the nervous system”, to use 
Dennett’s words, a process of purely upward causation, unaffected by meanings and 
contents, could only have given rise to that impressive coordination of movements by 
miracle, by virtue of coincidences of an astronomically low degree of probability. So, it 
is partly the search for a rational explanation of social and cultural communities and 
communal phenomena that should lead us to accept the influence of meanings and 
contents upon neurobiological processes in the brain and try to understand how it is 
possible without entering the realm of obscurity or mystery. 
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